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Abstract
Are individuals more sensitive to losses than gains in macroeconomic growth? Us-
ing subjective well-being measures across three large data sets, we observe an asym-
metry in the way positive and negative economic growth are experienced, with losses
having more than twice as much impact on individual happiness as compared to equiv-
alent gains. We use Gallup World Poll data drawn from 151 countries, BRFSS data
taken from a representative sample of 2.5 million US respondents, and Eurobarometer
data that cover multiple business cycles over four decades. This research provides a
new perspective on the welfare cost of business cycles with implications for growth pol-
icy and our understanding of the long-run relationship between GDP and subjective
well-being.
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11 Introduction
This paper explores a simple question: are individuals more sensitive to losses than gains
in macroeconomic growth? We use subjective well-being data drawn from three large and
complementary data sets to investigate whether economic downturns are associated with
decreases in individual well-being that are signicantly dierent from increases in well-being
from equivalent upswings. Our analyses reveal an asymmetry in the way that individuals
experience positive and negative macroeconomic uctuations. In fact, we nd evidence that
self-reported life satisfaction of individuals is between two and eight times more sensitive to
negative growth as compared to positive economic growth.
Our ndings speak to a number of topics in macroeconomics and behavioral economics.
In particular, this work addresses the welfare cost of business cycles (Lucas, 1987, 2003)
and recessions (Deaton, 2012). The use of an `experienced utility' rather than a `decision
utility' measure (Kahneman et al., 1997) means that welfare is considered here in terms
of subjective well-being rather than consumption. Although these welfare measures show
considerable overlap (Benjamin et al., 2012) their relationship to the business cycle contrasts
sharply. The dierence between volatile versus smooth growth in terms of consumption is
often considered small (Otrok, 2001; Lucas, 2003) but the psychological impact of volatile
growth on individual well-being appears to be consistently large yet is mostly overlooked
(with the notable exception of Wolfers (2003)). To our knowledge, there is no in-depth
study that allows for heterogeneous impacts of positive and negative growth. Doing so may
provide insight into the underlying mechanism that drives the welfare cost of volatile versus
smooth business cycles in terms of human well-being.
The question whether people are more sensitive to losses than equivalent gains in eco-
nomic growth relates to the famous behavioral nding on individual loss aversion that un-
derpins prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). Rather than appealing to the
concept of `decision utility' and seeking to reveal loss averse preferences through individu-
als' choices and behavior, we employ self-reported life satisfaction as a proxy for `experienced
utility' to show that a greater welfare weight is placed on national income losses as com-
pared to equivalent gains. Existing experimental evidence on prospect theory suggests that
prospective losses loom larger than prospective gains in determining individuals' decisions
and actions. We observe that individuals also experience losses more acutely than gains in
a macroeconomic setting.
The central nding of this research also allows us to revisit the longstanding debate on
the relationship between economic growth and well-being. Although we nd that economic
growth is signicantly associated with well-being, when split across positive and negative
economic growth we nd that this result is mostly driven by the negative growth years.
Recession years are signicantly associated with losses in well-being. We do not, however,
obtain an immediate relationship between positive growth years and well-being. This nding
makes it imperative that future research also consider positive and negative economic growth
2Figure 1: Greece 1981-2012 (Eurobarometer)
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data separately in piecewise analyses when studying the relationship between economic
growth and subjective well-being.
When considering the available longer-term data that cover entire business cycles, it
would appear that well-being reports have not risen in most of the world's economically
developed nations despite having almost doubled real GDP over the past four decades. This
result echoes research by Easterlin et al. (2010). The \paradox" resulting from the conicting
ndings in the short-term (using annual growth data that incorporates both positive and
negative growth years) versus long-term (real GDP data that cover one or more business
cycles) can perhaps be better understood in light of the results on macroeconomic \loss
aversion" presented here. Recessions can rapidly undo the well-being gains from longer
expansionary periods and lead to an insignicant relationship between national income and
average well-being when considered in the long run. Figure 1 shows the available data for
Greece in order to illustrate the asymmetric experience of positive and negative economic
growth. The recession that started in 2008 led to a decrease in average well-being that
erased all prior gains in well-being accumulated over more than a decade of consistent
growth. Average well-being in Greece now stands at a level below historical records, despite
real GDP remaining at a level well above recent historical gures.
To more formally explore this apparent macroeconomic loss aversion, we analyse data
from three large data sets|the Eurobarometer, the Gallup World Poll, and the US Be-
havioural Risk Factor Surveillance System (BRFSS)|and employ piecewise (or `segmented')
regression models with country and state xed eects that introduce separate terms for
3macroeconomic gains and losses. These data sets are complementary in that they each con-
tribute a dierent setting to test for asymmetric sensitivity to gains and losses in economic
growth. The Eurobarometer data include most European nations from about 1970 thus cov-
ering multiple business cycles and totaling over 1 million observations. The Gallup World
Poll data is drawn from representative samples from 151 countries totaling over 1 million
observations since 2005. The BRFSS data consists of 2.5 million observations drawn from
representative samples of each US state since 2005.
The paper is structured as follows. Section II reviews the relevant existing literature and
establishes the theoretical framework of the paper. Section III outlines the data and methods
used to derive our results, which are presented in section IV. Section V includes follow-up
analyses that explore possible mechanisms underlying macroeconomic loss aversion as well
as a discussion of the scholarly and policy implications.
2 Background
Subjective well-being as a measure of welfare
In order to investigate how macroeconomic uctuations are experienced by individuals, we
use self-reported `life satisfaction' as a welfare measure. Satisfaction with life is one of a
number of ways that subjective well-being|often loosely referred to as `happiness'|can be
measured and is the most commonly used well-being measure employed in the economic
literature|see for example Dolan et al. (2008) for a review. Besides `life satisfaction' there
are other measures of subjective well-being that focus more on positive and negative aect
and also meaningfulness (Dolan and Metcalfe, 2012). Although dierent measures of sub-
jective well-being can relate dierently to economic variables such as income (Kahneman
and Deaton, 2010; De Neve and Oswald, 2012) and personal circumstances such as unem-
ployment (Knabe et al., 2010), our analyses will employ the more evaluative measure|i.e.
life satisfaction|in line with most other relevant work in the eld.
Measures of subjective well-being have been validated using a number of approaches.
Oswald and Wu (2010) highlight the strong correlation between life satisfaction and objective
measures of quality of life. People's self-reports are also systematically similar to evaluations
of their happiness made by those around them (Sandvik et al., 1993). Further, studies have
identied correlations between activity in the left prefrontal cortex of the brain|which is
associated with satisfaction and pleasure|and higher reports of well-being (e.g. Sutton and
Davidson, 1997; Urry et al., 2004; Rutledge et al., 2014). The reliability of subjective well-
being measures has also been demonstrated by Krueger and Schkade (2008), who show the
stability of self-reported life satisfaction over time (see also Schimmack and Oishi, 2005).
Economic research using subjective well-being data is burgeoning but such cardinal mea-
sures of `experienced utility' remain distinct from the neoclassical notion of welfare that uses
ordinal measures of `decision utility' by way of revealed preferences (Kahneman et al., 1997;
4Rabin, 1998; Kahneman and Thaler, 2006)1. More recent work compares and bridges no-
tions of experienced and decision utility. Evidence presented by Benjamin et al. (2012)
suggests that measures of subjective well-being|and `life satisfaction' in particular|are
relatively good predictors of choice and can potentially be considered as a proxy (albeit an
imperfect one2) for the standard concept of decision utility (see also Benjamin et al., 2014;
Perez-Truglia, 2010).
Welfare cost of recessions
While relevant research has mostly studied the general relationship between economic growth
and happiness without considering positive and negative growth separately, some recent
work has specically explored losses in well-being from economic downturns. These studies
center on the recent recession and nd clear evidence for psychological costs of economic
losses. Deaton (2012) uses individual daily self-reports of life satisfaction to show that
subjective well-being tracked the US macroeconomy between 2008 and 2011, nding that
life satisfaction declines when GDP falls and unemployment rises; although it is worth noting
that the negative eect of the 2008 nancial crisis on subjective well-being is hard to detect
and had largely recovered by the end of 2010.3 Montagnoli and Moro (2014) use subjective
well-being data drawn from a European sample to highlight the negative eects of banking
crises on subjective well-being. Similarly, Kentikelenis et al. (2012) and Stuckler et al.
(2011) show that economic downturns are associated with decreases in mental and physical
health. In turn, Barr et al. (2012) and De Vogli et al. (2013) nd evidence of an increased
prevalence of suicide as a result of the recent great recession. These studies do not, however,
study whether economic downturns have a disproportionate eect on subjective well-being
as compared to economic upswings.
A larger literature exists on the welfare cost of business cycle volatility|when considering
consumption patterns rather than well-being as the measure of human welfare. Studying
how much extra consumption an individual would need to be indierent between stable
and volatile growth, Lucas (1987) shows that eliminating business cycle volatility would
bring only minimal welfare gains, and he thus prioritizes the pursuit of long-run economic
1Note that we use the notion of `experience' here to contrast between \experienced utility" (i.e. self-
reported subjective well-being) and \decision utility" (i.e. revealed preferences) following Kahneman et al.
(1997). Confusion may arise from the fact that self-reported measures of subjective well-being are subdivided
into \evaluative" (i.e. life satisfaction) and \hedonic" measures. The latter set of subjective well-being
measures assesses recent happiness `experiences' (e.g. `How happy were you yesterday') or employs the Day-
Reconstruction-Method (Kahneman et al., 2004)|a duration-weighted measure of well-being experience for
each activity the respondent engaged in over the span of a day.
2Benjamin et al. (2012) do nd some systematic reversals for the link between decision utility and
experience (see also Kahneman and Thaler, 2006).
3Aghion et al. (2014) also use daily self-reports drawn from Gallup (as well as data from the BRFSS)
to show that creative destruction|principally measured as job turnover|has a positive eect on life satis-
faction (through higher growth expectations) and a negative eect on subjective well-being (through higher
risk of displacement). The overall eect of creative destruction on subjective well-being is unambiguously
positive only when controlling for unemployment.
5growth over the stabilization of output (see also Otrok, 2001; Lucas, 2003). A growing
number of scholars, however, question the notion that the welfare cost of business cycles
would be negligible and provide evidence to the contrary (see e.g. Yellen and Akerlof, 2006;
Barlevy, 2004; De Santis, 2007). Wolfers (2003) actually uses subjective well-being measures
to estimate the welfare cost of business cycle volatility with regards to unemployment and
ination. He nds that greater unemployment volatility undermines well-being and that the
same holds to a lesser extent for ination. We contribute to this literature by suggesting that
business cycle volatility depresses welfare because individual well-being is more sensitive to
losses as compared to gains in economic growth.
Loss aversion
Our hypothesis that people are more sensitive to losses than equivalent gains in economic
growth is related to research on individual loss aversion that underpins prospect theory.
Originally a model of decision-making under risk developed by Kahneman and Tversky
(1979) and later widened to encompass decisions under certainty (Tversky and Kahneman,
1991), prospect theory suggests that economic agents evaluate their prospects in terms of
losses and gains relative to a reference point, and are loss averse in that the possibility of
losses looms larger than that of gains. Individuals make decisions based on the anticipation
that the experience of a loss will be more acute than that of a comparable gain, since `the
aggravation that one experiences in losing a sum of money appears to be greater than the
pleasure associated with gaining the same amount' (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979, p. 279).
Loss aversion has been demonstrated in a variety of settings|see for example Barberis
(2013) for an overview of the related literature. Other research has examined prospect
theory in relation to the wider economy, typically seeking to reveal loss averse preferences
through consumption behavior in response to macroeconomic uctuations (Bowman et al.,
1999; Rosenblatt-Wisch, 2008; Foellmi et al., 2011). However, as Kahneman (1999, p. 19)
observes, `the extent to which loss aversion is also found in experience is not yet known'.
Although losses may loom larger than gains in revealed preferences that does not necessarily
imply that losses are also experienced asymmetrically. Loss averse preferences can be the
result of an `aective forecasting error' explained by individuals overestimating the impact
that losses will eventually have, as shown by Kermer et al. (2006) (see also Rick, 2011).
Rather than appealing to the concept of `decision utility' and seeking to reveal loss averse
preferences through individuals' choices and behavior, we employ self-reported well-being as
a proxy for `experienced utility' to show that a greater welfare weight is placed on national
income losses than equivalent gains. We show that individuals experience losses more acutely
than gains in a macroeconomic setting.
While our study focuses on macroeconomic uctuations, related research has explored
microeconomic eects on subjective well-being of gains and losses in personal income. Boyce
et al. (2013) use subjective well-being data from a British and German panel to investigate
6the loss aversion hypothesis in relation to gains and losses in income. They nd evidence for
loss aversion in the experience of gains and losses in personal income and note that previous
studies of the relationship between personal income and individual happiness may have
overestimated the positive eect of income on well-being. Relatedly, Vendrik and Woltjer
(2007) incorporate loss aversion into their analysis to consider whether the eect of income
on subjective well-being is greater when it is below rather than above the level of a regional
age-education reference group, while Senik (2009) tests the signicance of other reference
groups based on internal (e.g. respondent's past) and local (e.g. colleagues) comparisons.
Economic growth and subjective well-being
The central nding of this research also allows us to revisit the longstanding debate on
the relationship between economic growth and well-being. The linkages between income,
economic growth, and subjective well-being are the subject of much research. Within coun-
tries, wealthier individuals report higher life satisfaction than people who are less well o, a
relationship that holds at any one point in time as well as over time, although the marginal
income eect on happiness becomes weaker at higher levels of individual income (e.g. Blanch-
ower and Oswald, 2004; Ferrer-i Carbonell and Frijters, 2004; Layard et al., 2008; Kahne-
man and Deaton, 2010).4 At the country level, nations with higher GDP per capita have
higher aggregate subjective well-being in cross-sectional analyses (Stevenson and Wolfers,
2008; Deaton, 2008; Helliwell et al., 2013) with some research nding evidence for a satiation
point (Proto and Rustichini, 2013) while other research does not (Sacks et al., 2012).
The aggregate time-series relationship remains the subject of an important debate in the
literature and centers around the question originally put forth by Easterlin (1974): Does
economic growth improve the human lot? Most observers nd that economic growth is
positively associated with well-being but that over longer periods of time the relationship
appears to be insignicant (e.g. Layard, 2005; Clark et al., 2008). The happiness-income
paradox thus boils down to contrasting ndings in the short versus long-term relationship
between economic growth and happiness (Easterlin et al., 2010). For example, Di Tella
et al. (2003) use the Eurobarometer and the General Social Survey to establish evidence
of short-run co-movement of subjective well-being and macroeconomic variables. However,
investigating longer-term rst dierences, Easterlin et al. (2010) fail to nd the signicant
relationship between national income growth and aggregate well-being over the long run that
one would expect given the cross-sectional as well as short-run time series relationships.
Conversely, Sacks et al. (2013) employ xed eects models to nd a signicant positive
relationship between the level of (log) GDP and life satisfaction over time (see also Sacks
et al., 2010, 2012)5.
4Recent studies raise the possibility of `reverse causality' in the relationship between individual income
and happiness by showing that subjective well-being can also be a driver of productivity and later earnings
(De Neve and Oswald, 2012; Oswald et al., 2009).
5Sacks et al. (2013) reconcile the opposed ndings on the long-term relationship between growth in well-
7We nd that economic growth is associated with well-being but that this result is mostly
driven by the negative growth years. Assessed over one or more business cycles, the dis-
proportional sensitivity to recessions can undo the well-being gains from longer periods of
positive growth and thus lead to a null relationship in the long run. Seen as such, the
apparent paradox in the short versus long-term relationship between economic growth and
happiness can thus be understood as the result of macroeconomic loss aversion.
3 Data and Methods
We use subjective well-being data from three complementary data sets: The Eurobarometer,
covering a relatively small set of countries but over a longer period of four decades; the
Gallup World Poll, oering a wider set of countries over a shorter period of time; and the
Behavioural Risk Factor Surveillance System (BRFSS) providing quarterly data for each of
the US states from 2005, allowing us to test our hypothesis within a single country. Annual
economic growth data are obtained from the World Bank for the analyses conducted on the
Gallup and Eurobarometer data and US quarterly state income data are obtained from the
Bureau of Economic Analysis for the BRFSS analyses.
Eurobarometer
The Eurobarometer is an opinion survey carried out on behalf of the European Commission
that has typically, though not always, taken place twice a year. For each wave, a random
sample of approximately 1,000 individuals from each country in the European Union is
interviewed on a range of issues including how satised they are with the life they lead.
The response options are: very satised, fairly satised, not very satised, and not at all
satised. This four category subjective well-being question has been included at least once
every year from 1973 to 2012, apart from 1974.
The Eurobarometer began with 9 countries and has grown over time along with the
expansion of the EU and the inclusion of additional member states. In fact, a number of
countries joined the EU|and the Eurobarometer|after 2004 but are not included in our
sample as there is only a comparatively small amount of data available for these (mostly
Eastern European) nations that could bias our results; see Sacks et al. (2013) for a detailed
discussion on the potential drawbacks of including these new EU member states in our
analyses. (Eurobarometer countries excluded this way are, however, included in the Gallup
World Poll data which span shorter time series.) The data we use come from an unbalanced
panel of the so-called EU-15, for which the minimum time-series is 18 years and the maximum
39 years.
being and growth in GDP by pointing to the inclusion of controls for survey-specic xed eects and the
use by Easterlin et al. (2010) of country-years with non-representative sampling frames.
8Table 1: Descriptive Statistics: Eurobarometer
Variable Obs Mean Std Dev Min Max
Reported life satisfaction 1,049,972 3.07 0.75 1 4
GDP growth 493 1.87 2.65 -8.97 10.22
Negative growth 89 -2.13 1.97 -8.97 -0.02
Positive growth 404 2.76 1.84 0.17 10.22
GDP growth (t-1) 493 1.93 2.57 -8.97 10.22
GDP per capita (2005 US $) 493 26,987 9621 12,228 74,021
Unemployment rate 493 7.99 4.08 0.03 25.13
Ination rate 493 4.61 4.62 -4.48 24.46
Gallup World Poll
The Gallup World Poll is a large-scale repeated cross-sectional survey initiated in 2005
covering more than 150 countries; although not all countries participated in all waves. The
frequency of the survey is annual in most countries and quarterly in a small number of
countries (e.g. Germany and the US). The data for the analyses reported in this article are
drawn from the seven waves of the Gallup World Poll run between 2005/06 and 2012.
All samples in the Gallup World Poll are probability based and nationally representative
of the resident population aged 15 and older. The typical Gallup World Poll survey inter-
views 1,000 individuals. In some large countries, such as China and Russia, sample sizes
of at least 2,000 individuals are collected. Telephone surveys are used in countries where
telephone coverage represents at least 80% of the population (or is the customary survey
methodology). In Central and Eastern Europe, as well as in the developing world, including
much of Latin America, the former Soviet Union countries, nearly all of Asia, the Middle
East, and Africa, an area frame design is used for face-to-face interviewing.6
Gallup uses a standard set of core questions that has been translated into the major
languages of the respective countries. The survey is based on a common questionnaire that
asks respondents a broad set of questions on socio-economic background, civic engagement,
and satisfaction with living standards. The survey also asks a variety of subjective well-
being questions, including the Cantril Self-Anchoring Striving Scale (Cantril, 1965) where
respondents are asked to select the \step" on a ladder scale that best represents their life;
the steps on this ladder are numbered from 0 to 10, where 0 indicates the worst possible life
and 10 the best possible life.
BRFSS
The Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System (BRFSS) contains quarterly data obtained
through telephone surveys and is carried out by the Centre for Disease Control and Preven-
tion (CDC) in the United States. The primary aim is to collect data on the most important
6Details about the methodology for each country are available at
http://www.gallup.com/se/128171/Country-Data-Set-Details-May-2010.aspx
9Table 2: Descriptive Statistics: Gallup World Poll
Variable Obs Mean Std Dev Min Max
Reported life satisfaction 1,008,073 5.52 2.2 0 10
GDP growth 815 2.68 4.34 -17.55 33.03
Negative growth 170 -2.92 3.2 -17.55 0
Positive growth 645 4.09 3.34 0.02 33.03
GDP growth (t-1) 815 3.02 4.56 -14.42 33.03
GDP per capita (2005 US $) 815 13,563 13,810 322 72,650
Unemployment rate 485 8.15 5.17 0.1 34.9
Ination rate 786 5.96 5.62 -13.23 59.22
risk factors leading to premature death, such as cigarette smoking, alcohol use, and hyper-
tension. A four category life satisfaction question|with response categories: very satised,
satised, dissatised, very dissatised|was included from 2005 until 2010. In most quarters,
there have been surveys in 50 or 51 states, with outliers in 2008/1 (46 states) and 2009/1
(38 States). In total there are 1,197 state-quarter observations from 2005/1 to 2010/4.
The scale of the life satisfaction survey measure is rather limited with approximately
94% of respondents answering `satised' or `very satised'. The BRFSS samples a large
number of US individuals with approximately 400,000 respondents per year, divided across
the dierent states and dierent months of the year. The subjective well-being data are
matched with quarterly state-personal income data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis
and quarterly state level unemployment data and quarterly nationwide ination data from
the Bureau of Labour Statistics.
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics: BRFSS
Variable Obs Mean Std Dev Min Max
Reported life satisfaction 2,287,030 3.387 0.628 1 4
GDP growth 1,222 0.13 0.846 -3.963 3.261
Negative growth 446 -0.746 0.627 -3.963 -0.001
Positive growth 776 0.632 0.457 0.005 3.261
GDP growth (t-1) 1,222 0.18 0.835 -3.963 3.261
State income per capita (2005 $) 1,222 35,644 6,149 26,312 64,598
Unemployment rate 1,222 6.031 2.39 2.067 14.367
Ination rate 1,222 0.580 0.983 -2.828 2,195
Empirical Strategy
To investigate the relationship between economic growth and subjective well-being we esti-
mate the equation
Yijt = 1Xjt + j + t + "ijt (1)
10where Yijt is the (standardised) subjective well-being of individual i in country j in year t,
and Xjt is the rate of economic growth from year t-1 to year t. In the case of the BRFSS
Yijt is the (standardised) subjective well-being of individual i in U.S. state j in quarter
t, and Xjt is the mean rate of economic growth over the previous four quarters. j is an
entity xed eect, t a year xed eect, and "ijt an error term clustered on country-years
(state-quarters). Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent (HAC), standard errors
clustered on country-years (state-quarters), are reported throughout.
In the Eurobarometer and Gallup World Poll (i.e. the national level) models, country
and year xed eects are included. In the BRFSS models, state and season xed eects
are employed. Country(state)-specic intercepts diminish the threat of omitted variable
bias by controlling for unobserved heterogeneity across countries (states), such that time-
invariant factors like culture and climate are controlled for. Time-specic intercepts control
for time-variant trends and shocks that apply equally across the sample. Another important
reason to include such intercepts is to partial out variance in survey design over time.
Deaton (2012) shows that question ordering and context eects are typically substantial in
relation to subjective well-being questions, particularly when political questions are asked
prior to them (see also Sacks et al., 2013; Schwarz and Strack, 1999; Strack et al., 1988). In
the Eurobarometer, for example, the question order has not remained constant over time.
Further, each round has typically featured a section on a topical (usually social or political)
theme, which has ranged widely in nature from survey to survey, and is likely to exert
context eects on the life satisfaction response.
To test for any asymmetric eects of economic growth, we then t a piecewise linear
regression model that introduces separate terms for negative and positive growth, such that
Yijt = 1X
+
jt + 2jX
 jjt + j + t + "ijt (2)
where X+ is equal to economic growth in country-years (state-quarters) in which growth is
positive, 0 otherwise; and X  is equal to the absolute value of the economic growth rate
where growth is negative, 0 otherwise.
After establishing whether an asymmetry exists in the subjective experience of negative
and positive economic growth, we gradually introduce a number of individual-level controls
(age, age-squared, employment status, gender, education, and marriage status), lags, and
macroeconomic controls (the natural logarithm of GDP per capita, the unemployment rate,
and the ination rate).
4 Results
Our main result is that, across all three data sets, subjective well-being is more sensitive to
decreases in national income than it is to equivalent increases. Table 4 shows that subjective
well-being is positively and signicantly associated with the economic growth rate. A one
11unit increase in the growth rate is associated with a 0.017 standard deviation rise in well-
being in the Eurobarometer sample, and a 0.005 standard deviation increase in the other
two data sets.
Introducing separate terms for positive and negative growth|and thus allowing the
slope gradient to dier for economic gains and losses|we nd in all three data sets that
the statistical relationship between economic growth and happiness appears to be driven
principally by episodes of negative growth. The negative growth terms are greater in both
magnitude and statistical signicance. In the European sample, the coecient for negative
growth is around six times greater than that of positive growth, which is not well-dened
statistically. For a 10% economic contraction there would be a corresponding 0.41 standard
deviation drop in life satisfaction, but an equivalent 10% expansion of the economy brings
along a statistically ill-dened increase of only 0.07 standard deviation. These estimates
correspond to a 0.55 decrease and a 0.09 increase on the 4-point life satisfaction scale,
respectively.
Table 4: Economic Growth and Subjective Well-Being
Eurobarometer Gallup World Poll BRFSS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Economic Growth 0.017*** 0.005*** 0.005***
(0.005) (0.002) (0.001)
Negative Growth -0.041** -0.008*** -0.008***
(0.017) 0.003 (0.002)
Positive Growth 0.007 0.004* 0.001
(0.004) (0.002) (0.003)
Loss aversion ratio 6 2 8
Nmacro 493 493 815 815 1222 1222
Nmicro 1,049,972 1,049,972 1,008,073 1,008,073 2,283,596 2,283,596
R2 0.005 0.006 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
Clustered standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0:1, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01
Dependent variable: life satisfaction (standardised)
Country and year dummies included in models 1-4, state and season dummies in 5-6
Economic growth variables are the absolute value of negative or positive growth, 0 otherwise
Similarly, in the Gallup World Poll sample, which includes a wider range of countries over
a shorter time span, a 10% economic contraction of the economy would be associated with
a 0.08 standard deviation decrease in subjective well-being, yet an equivalent expansion is
related with a rise in life satisfaction of only half the size, 0.04 standard deviation. With the
BRFSS, a 10% decrease in the mean growth rate over the previous four quarters is related
with a concurrent 0.08 standard deviation decrease in life satisfaction in the current quarter,
but a comparable increase in the growth rate is not signicantly related with subjective well-
12being. From a human well-being perspective, the results from the three data sets would
suggest that some 2 to 8 percent of economic growth would be required to oset just 1
percent of economic contraction.
The asymmetry in the relationship between economic growth and well-being can be seen
clearly in Figure 2, which plots the coecients for negative and positive growth separately on
the x-axis, and subjective well-being on the y-axis. This representation looks similar to the
well-known utility function of prospect theory|showing that losses loom larger than gains
in decision utility (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). Here, Figure 2 suggests that individuals
experience macroeconomic losses more acutely than equivalent gains in annual growth.
Robustness
In order to highlight the core asymmetry in the relationship between macroeconomic expan-
sions and contractions with subjective well-being, Table 4 includes neither individual nor
macroeconomic controls, except country (state) and year (season) xed eects. Including
a vector of personal controls hardly alters the growth coecients, but does increase the R2
values, since personal circumstances and characteristics inevitably explain a good deal of
variance in life satisfaction.
It is plausible that the estimated negative impact of losses in growth on subjective
well-being arises due to increases in unemployment that tend to accompany such economic
contractions. Table 5 shows that the inclusion of a control for the aggregate level of un-
employment does little to alter the loss aversion nding in the European case, and indeed
seems to strengthen it in the American sample. Reecting the well-established direct and
indirect impact of joblessness, an increase in the unemployment rate is negatively associated
with life satisfaction in Europe, a relationship that also holds when controlling for individual
unemployment. Macroeconomic loss aversion in relation to economic growth is robust to
inclusion of the unemployment rate in the Eurobarometer and BRFSS data but not in the
Gallup data, oering somewhat mixed evidence on whether our nding on economic growth
could reect loss aversion to rising unemployment.
In the Gallup World Poll the inclusion of the unemployment rate leads to the loss of
signicance of the negative growth term and strengthens the positive growth term. Inclu-
sion of the unemployment rate also leads to a decrease in the negative growth term for
the European data, although the term remains signicant. Such a decrease in the growth
terms would be expected since growth and unemployment rates usually move in parallel. In
the Gallup World Poll, the correlation between growth, and negative growth in particular,
and the unemployment rate is stronger than in the European and American samples; an
explanation for this dierence in correlations can be found in the more diverse sample of
countries in the Gallup World Poll. A strong correlation between these two predictors in
our regression model means that the estimates for the eect of GDP growth on well-being,
controlling for unemployment rate, tend to be less precise than if growth in GDP and un-
13Figure 2: Asymmetric Experience of Positive and Negative Growth
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Notes: Plots the coecients for negative and positive growth taken from the regression analyses
reported in Table 4. 95% condence intervals reported.
14Table 5: Asymmetric experience of positive and negative growth: The role of unemployment
Eurobarometer Gallup World Poll BRFSS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Economic Growth 0.011*** 0.004** 0.007***
(0.004) (0.002) (0.002)
Negative Growth -0.028** -0.003 -0.012***
(0.012) (0.003) (0.002)
Positive Growth 0.004 0.004** 0.001
(0.004) (0.002) (0.002)
Unemployment Rate -0.023*** -0.022*** -0.020*** -0.020*** 0.001* 0.002***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001)
Loss Aversion Ratio 7 1 12
Nmacro 493 493 485 485 1222 1222
Nmicro 1,049,972 1,049,972 583,670 583,670 2,283,596 2,283,596
R2 0.007 0.008 0.003 0.003 0.001 0.001
Clustered standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0:1, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01
Dependent variable: life satisfaction (standardised)
Country and year dummies included in models 1-4, state and season dummies in 5-6
Economic growth variables are the absolute value of negative or positive growth, 0 otherwise
employment were uncorrelated. Given that the correlation between economic growth and
unemployment was the greatest when focusing solely on countries with negative growth
rates, the inclusion of the unemployment rate leads to the loss of signicance of the negative
growth term, but not of the positive growth term. We also note that, for many countries
included in the Gallup World Poll, no information can be found on unemployment rates,
and this is especially the case for recent years. As such, when adding the unemployment
rate as control variable, the number of higher level observations in our model drops from
815 to 485, with an accompanying loss of statistical power.
In Table 6 we introduce a full set of individual and macroeconomic controls as well as
one year lags of the economic growth variables. In the Eurobarometer sample, a control for
the current level of GDP is not signicant, which suggests that, at least in Europe, welfare
is a function of changes rather than levels of national income.
In the Gallup World Poll, the level-of-GDP variable dominates. Several factors may help
to explain this nding. First, compared to the European and American samples, the group
of countries covered in the Gallup World Poll is characterized by a much larger variation in
the current level of GDP. This larger variation may explain why the level-of-GDP variable is
dominant in the Gallup data, while it does not enter signicantly in the European sample.
Secondly, the loss of signicance of the growth terms in the Gallup data is linked to the fact
that cross-sectional and longitudinal relationships are not fully distinguished in this model.
15Table 6: Asymmetric experience of positive and negative growth: The role of covariates
Eurobarometer Gallup World Poll BRFSS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Economic growth 0.008** 0.003 0.004***
(0.004) (0.002) (0.001)
Negative growth -0.027** 0.002 -0.008***
(0.012) (0.004) (0.002)
Positive growth 0.000 0.002 0.000
(0.004) (0.002) (0.002)
GDP per capita (log) 0.047 0.037 0.591*** 0.680*** 0.073*** 0.069***
(0.072) (0.070) (0.182) (0.171) (0.026) (0.026)
Ination rate 0.001 0.001 -0.002 -0.003 -0.002* -0.002*
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001)
Unemployment rate -0.017*** -0.017*** -0.009** -0.010** 0.001* 0.001**
(0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001)
Economic growth (-1) 0.006* 0.004** -0.009***
(0.004) (0.002) (0.001)
Negative growth (-1) -0.003 -0.006* 0.009***
(0.011) (0.003) (0.002)
Positive growth (-1) 0.008* 0.008*** -0.008***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.002)
Nmacro 493 493 409 409 1197 1197
Nmicro 1,048,008 1,048,008 491,545 491,545 2,267,428 2,267,428
R2 0.062 0.063 0.051 0.051 0.095 0.095
Clustered standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0:1, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01
Dependent variable: life satisfaction (standardised)
Country and year dummies included in models 1-4, state and season dummies in 5-6
Individual controls included: age, gender, education level, employment status, marital status
Economic growth variables are the absolute value of negative and positive growth, 0 otherwise
16The level-of-GDP variable not only captures variation across countries in GDP level, but
also the change in GDP compared to the previous year within each country (a country's
current GDP = GDP at t-1 + GDP growth from t-1 to t). As such, the positive and negative
growth terms in the model are redundant, and the estimates for these eects tend to be less
precise.7
The introduction of one-year lags on growth provides an inconsistent picture across the
three data sets. The positive results on lagged growth rates in the Eurobarometer and the
Gallup data would appear to indicate that even though positive growth has no immediate
impact on life satisfaction (that is, within the year that growth is being measured) it may
have a delayed medium-term eect, though the magnitude of this delayed positive eect
remains smaller than the immediate impact of negative growth.
Expectations
The main focus of this paper is whether actual growth rates have an asymmetric relationship
to well-being in the present, and Table 7 reports that this nding is robust to the inclusion
of individual expectations about the future. As is the case with prospect theory, individuals
are forward-looking and anticipate expected gains and losses, the prospect of future gains
or losses are reected in current preferences and subjective well-being and can serve as a
reference point (K} oszegi and Rabin, 2006, 2008). The Eurobarometer data include a forward-
looking question that gauges positive and negative growth expectations: \Do you think the
economy will get better, worse, or stay the same over the next year?" The same question
is also asked in relation to \life in general" rather than the economy. Introducing indicator
variables for positive and negative expectations (versus neutral expectations)8 allows us to
test whether the asymmetric experience of current gains and losses in growth is robust to
inclusion of expectations about both life in general as well as the domestic economy. This
measure also allows for a preliminary test of whether prospective gains or losses in economic
growth are associated with current well-being and, if so, whether there is an asymmetrical
relationship.
7A regression model, which allows distinguishing cross-sectional and longitudinal relationships, would
include GDP at time t-1 (instead of GDP at time t); in this specication, GDP growth from time t-1 to t
is no longer also captured in the GDP term.
8Positive (negative) expectations are coded 1 for a response of \better" (\worse"), leaving the \same"
response as the omitted category.
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18Table 7 (models 1 and 4) reports on simple regressions that indicates that expectations|
both on life and on the economy|are strongly associated with current subjective well-being.
In line with the predictions of Prospect Theory in terms of decision utility, we nd that
negative expectations are associated with a somewhat greater impact on current experienced
utility. The prospect of future macroeconomic losses thus appears to loom larger than
equivalent macroeconomic gains, and is reected in individuals' current life satisfaction. At
the same time, as reported in Table 7 (models 3, 6, and 7) current negative growth remains
signicantly associated with current life satisfaction in contrast to current positive growth.
These results seem to suggest that there is a simultaneous asymmetry in the experience of
actual gains and losses as well as prospective gains and losses.
5 Discussion
These ndings have a number of theoretical implications. First, the results presented here
suggest that loss aversion is not simply a `hedonic forecasting error' as suggested by Kermer
et al. (2006). Our results indicate that individuals actually experience losses more acutely
than gains in a macroeconomic setting and this may provide insight into the mechanism
that drives the welfare cost of volatile versus smooth business cycles in terms of human
well-being. Second, this nding suggests that future research should consider positive and
negative economic growth data separately in piecewise analyses in order to correctly interpret
the gradient for the general relationship between economic growth and subjective well-being.
Third, although we investigate the short-run association of macroeconomic movements and
life satisfaction year-to-year (and in the case of the USA, quarter-to-quarter), the nding of
macroeconomic loss aversion may be able to provide an alternative explanation for the long-
term income-happiness paradox that is complementary to the two most prominent current
accounts, namely the psychological mechanisms of hedonic adaptation and social comparison
(see Clark et al., 2008).
An alternative explanation for the long-term income-happiness paradox
The asymmetry in the subjective experience of negative growth may help to reconcile the
short versus long-term trends in the income-happiness relationship. When considering the
available longer-term data (that cover entire business cycles) it would appear that well-
being has not risen in most of the world's economically developed nations despite having
almost doubled real GDP over the past four decades (Easterlin et al., 2010). The \paradox"
resulting from the conicting ndings in the short versus long-term relationship between
national income and subjective well-being can perhaps be better understood in light of
the results on macroeconomic loss aversion presented here. Periodic recessions can rapidly
undo the well-being gains from longer expansionary periods and lead to an insignicant
relationship between national income and average well-being when considered in the long
19run.
Imagine a 10-year business cycle consisting of 8 years of steady growth followed by two
recession years. If we treat positive and negative growth as qualitatively the same, then we
would expect to see a general upward trend (much like that of real national income)|leading
to a positive long-run growth-well-being relationship. However, if people are more sensitive
to negative growth, than the well-being gains accumulated over 8 years of positive growth
can be wiped out by 2 years of negative growth. Over the whole cycle (and over multiple
cycles), despite the short-run relationship, the net change in aggregate life satisfaction can
be zero. This dynamic can be seen in the theoretical representation of national income and
subjective well-being shown on panel (a) of Figure 3. Panel (b) shows the actual relationship
using the Eurobarometer data. For each year, the mean of both life satisfaction and real
GDP per capita are taken, weighted by national population, for all of the countries sampled
by the Eurobarometer in that year. Both measures are shown over time in proportion to
their magnitude in 1973. Plots of aggregate time-series of subjective well-being in each of the
15 countries are included in the appendix. Long-run change in societal well-being appears
to be a function of how much it has managed to grow in total as well as how volatile growth
has been.
This explanation for the long-term income-happiness paradox is complementary to the
two most prominent current accounts, namely the psychological mechanisms of hedonic
adaptation and social comparison (see Clark et al., 2008). Easterlin (2010, pp. 126-6) also
considers the theoretical possibility that aspirations will rise with positive growth in national
income but not fall with macroeconomic losses, leading to dierential adaptation to gains
and losses and the long-run stagnation of aggregate happiness over multiple business cycles.
A better understanding of this dynamic has macroeconomic policy implications and ad-
dresses a long-standing debate. On the one hand, a typical reading of the income-happiness
paradox suggests that further growth in the developed world is a futile means to the end of
improving societal well-being. On the other, researchers who nd evidence of a positive rela-
tionship between well-being and GDP typically take from this that further economic growth
is good for society. Our ndings suggest a more nuanced perspective: policy designed to
engineer economic \booms", but that risks even relatively short \busts" is unlikely to im-
prove societal well-being in the long-run. Steady positive growth that minimizes the risk of
economic contraction seems the most likely route to an improvement in general well-being.
Mechanisms
Why do individuals experience macroeconomic losses more negatively than they experience
equivalent gains positively? While beyond the scope of this paper to provide a conclusive
answer, there are several possible avenues to address this important follow-up question. A
deep-rooted mechanism could be that individuals simply react more strongly to negative
developments. Humans' disproportionate sensitivity to negative stimuli and the general
20Figure 3: Long-term income-happiness paradox and the asymmetric experience of positive
and negative growth
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21nding that \bad is stronger than good" (Baumeister et al., 2001) may have an explanation
rooted in evolutionary biology (McDermott et al., 2008), since in terms of survival the
avoidance of threats is more important than a missed opportunity.
Volatility also leads to uncertainty and such feelings are attention-seeking (Wiggins et al.,
1992), and may prevent individuals from adapting to shocks (Wilson and Gilbert, 2008). Pe-
riods of economic contraction not only involve a loss of national income but also an increase
in economic uncertainty (Bloom, 2009, 2014), which is arguably intensied by the dispro-
portionate coverage of negative news about macroeconomic trends compared to respective
positive trends (Soroka, 2006). Luechinger et al. (2010) highlight the role of economic inse-
curity in increasing angst and stress by showing that the subjective well-being of employed
individuals working in the public sector, who in general enjoy more job protection, is less
acutely aected by economic shocks than comparable workers in the private sector.
A further, non-psychological conduit between recession and subjective well-being may
be consumption behaviour. Rosenblatt-Wisch (2008) shows that negative growth has a
disproportionate eect on consumption. Economic uncertainty may lead individuals to
consume fewer goods and services compared to any increases brought about by equivalent
economic upswings leading to disproportionate losses of well-being.
Limitations
This study is not without its limitations. First, we note a number of important methodolog-
ical concerns. On the one hand, there are conceptual dierences among the life satisfaction
questions used across the three surveys. While the Eurobarometer and BRFSS data include
an evaluative question of subjective well-being, the Gallup surveys use Cantril's ladder, re-
sponses to which are anchored to the respondent's own reference point of their `best possible
life'. Discrepancies between these two types of questions have been documented (Bjornskov,
2010). Estimates across datasets should therefore be compared with caution. On the other
hand, it has been suggested that|similar to responses given to all subjective questions|
self-reported subjective well-being is susceptible to mode of interview, with higher levels
of evaluative, experienced, and eudemonic measures of well-being reported on telephone
compared to face-to-face interviews (Dolan and Kavetsos, 2012). Mode eects have sub-
stantial implications for the comparability of our results between surveys given that the
Eurobarometer uses face-to-face interviews, the BRFSS phone interviews, and Gallup uses
a mix of phone and face-to-face interviews. Moreover, each mode has, in turn, additional
implications on reported subjective well-being based on the diculty of reaching respon-
dents on the phone (Heetz and Rabin, 2013) and the presence of others during face-to-face
interviews (Conti and Pudney, 2011). Our results aim to provide broad evidence in favor of
the asymmetric experience of positive and negative growth across multiple sources of data
frequently used in the economics literature, rather than highlighting the dierences between
these.
22Comparing individuals across countries as diverse as those included in the Gallup World
Poll is also potentially problematic. Indeed we might well expect the relationship between
national income and subjective well-being to be very dierent in the developed and de-
veloping worlds. Reliable macroeconomic data is also dicult to obtain for a number of
developing countries included in the Gallup sample.
To simplify the analysis, we have assumed (piecewise) linearity in the income growth{
well-being relationship. Further research may relax this linearity assumption in order to
test for any diminishing sensitivity to both positive and negative economic growth. It has
also been shown, in the developed world at least, that populations adapt to changes in
national income (Di Tella et al., 2010); a further avenue of research could well investigate
any asymmetries in the way in which individuals adapt to gains and losses in national
income. Indeed Easterlin (2010) conjectures that adaptation to losses is likely to be much
less complete than adaptation to gains.
An important avenue for further research will focus on more precisely determining the
level of economic growth against which populations evaluate gains and losses. In this paper
we have assumed the current level of income (that is, zero growth) to be the reference point,
negative growth away from the status quo is a loss, positive growth a gain. However, it is
conceivable that the reference point might be the previous year's growth rate, or some other
growth rate that is considered \normal". A population that experienced -4% growth in year
t   1 may well consider a growth rate of -1% in year t a gain, even though it represents
an absolute loss of national income. In this sense, individuals get used to a certain level of
growth and expect this growth to continue going forward, and then use these expectations
as a reference point, judging growth that falls below the expected rate as a loss even if
it is actually an absolute gain. Models that include terms for (positive and negative) 
growth in order to explain subjective well-being do not uncover any signicant relationships,
however. An alternative approach is to impose other potential reference points such as -1%
or 1% growth. Results from such an approach using non-zero economic growth rates as the
spline pivot are reported in the Appendix and present a relatively consistent picture of the
asymmetric experience of positive and negative growth when considering dierent growth
rates as reference points.
An important further concern about the nding of macroeconomic loss aversion is that
it may well simply reect the decreasing marginal utility of (national) income. Layard et al.
(2008), for example, use subjective well-being data across a number of data sets to nd that
marginal utility of personal income falls as income rises. To seek to address this, Table A1
reports models that employ negative and positive changes in the natural logarithm of GDP
per capita as explanatory variables in the place of growth in untransformed national income.
The ndings are similar, also identifying a clear asymmetry across the three datasets in the
relationship between subjective well-being and economic expansions and contractions.
236 Conclusion
Existing literature has established that subjective well-being covaries with national income
to some extent, with the exception of developed nations when considered in long time series.
The results presented here build on this earlier research by demonstrating an asymmetry in
the subjective experience of positive and negative growth. As a result, they help to reconcile
the short versus long-term trends in the income-happiness relationship.
Standard analyses of the income-happiness relationship could arguably be interpreted as
`growth is good.' However, in light of the asymmetric experience of positive and negative
growth, an empirically more accurate interpretation of the income-happiness relationship
would be that `recessions are bad'. The problem of labeling results by one pole of a di-
mension reects deep linguistic habits rather than the structure of the data (e.g. `growth'
conjures economic expansion whereas almost a quarter of the data in fact cover economic
contractions). This semantic problem is widespread in the literature. For example, Kahne-
man and Deaton (2010) and De Neve and Oswald (2012) consider the relationship between
personal income and subjective well-being, nding that earnings and happiness are to some
extent predictive of each other. However, in both these papers the underlying data struc-
ture is not tested for whether the relationship is perhaps principally accounted for by the
negative poles of the earnings and happiness spectrums. This issue also extends beyond the
income-happiness relationship. To illustrate, suppose that being very short is more likely to
make one miserable than being very tall to make one happy. The relationship would still be
described as connecting happiness to `height'. Piecewise regressions such as detailed in this
research can help distill important relationships and aid our interpretation of them.
Academic and policy discussions can overlook whether people are more sensitive to gains
or losses in economic growth and focus instead on the benets of economic growth. As a re-
sult, most policies are evaluated by their impact on economic growth as such with less regard
to any disproportionate psychological toll that recessions may exert. Our analyses reveal
an asymmetry in the way that individuals experience positive and negative macroeconomic
uctuations. We nd evidence that self-reported life satisfaction of individuals is more than
twice as sensitive to negative growth as compared to positive economic growth rates. Our
work indicates the need for nuanced growth policies and the careful use of economic growth
data when considering welfare eects in terms of well-being. In sum, we suggest that pol-
icymakers and academics should not only evaluate how much the economy has grown but
also how the economy has grown.
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31Table A1: Asymmetric experience of positive and negative changes in log GPD per capita
Eurobarometer Gallup World Poll BRFSS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
 (ln)GDP 1.499*** 1.861*** 0.440***
(0.290) (0.853) (0.077)
Spline: -ve  (ln)GDP -3.597*** -2.836** -0.613***
(0.873) (1.269) (0.141)
Spline: +ve  (ln)GDP 0.562* 0.968 0.205
(0.292) (1.523) (0.177)
GDP per capita (ln) 0.253*** 0.241*** 3.404** 3.479*** -0.099*** -0.103***
(0.051) (0.050) (0.776) (0.77) (0.022) (0.022)
Age -0.024*** -0.024*** -0.101*** -0.101*** -0.010*** -0.010***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.005) (0.005) (0.000) (0.000)
Age-squared 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.000*** 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Male -0.026*** -0.026*** -0.179*** -0.179*** -0.032*** -0.032***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.02) (0.02) (0.001) (0.001)
Education: low -0.247*** -0.247*** -2.282*** -2.282*** -0.254*** -0.254***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.048) (0.048) (0.004) (0.004)
Education: medium -0.129*** -0.129*** -1.081*** -1.081*** -0.151*** -0.151***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.034) (0.034) (0.001) (0.001)
Married 0.229*** 0.229*** 0.462*** 0.462*** 0.375*** 0.375***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.033) (0.033) (0.001) (0.001)
Unemployed -0.487*** -0.487*** -1.217*** -1.217*** -0.618*** -0.618***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.091) (0.091) (0.002) (0.002)
Nmicro 1,048,008 1,048,008 737,430 737,430 2,267,428 2,267,428
Nmacro 493 493 580 580 1,222 1,222
R2 0.048 0.049 0.044 0.044 0.095 0.095
Dependent variable: subjective well-being (standardised)
Country and year dummies included in models 1-4, state and season dummies in 5-6
Clustered standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0:1, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01
Splines are the absolute value of negative or positive  GDP, 0 otherwise
32Table A2: Reference Points: Eurobarometer
Reference Point Neg. Growth Pos. Growth Ratio
-2 -0.044 0.011*** 4
-1.5 -0.047* 0.010*** 4.7
-1 -0.046** 0.008** 5.75
-0.5 -0.044** 0.007* 6.29
-0.1 -0.042** 0.007 6
0 -0.041** 0.006 6.83
0.1 -0.041** 0.006 6.83
0.5 -0.038** 0.006 6.33
1 -0.035*** 0.005 7
1.5 -0.032*** 0.004 8
2 -0.028*** 0.005 5.6
* p < 0:1, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01
DV: life satisfaction (standardised)
Table A3: Reference Points: Gallup World Poll
Reference Point Neg. Growth Pos. Growth Ratio
-2 -0.010*** 0.004* 2.54
-1.5 -0.010*** 0.004* 2.38
-1 -0.009*** 0.004* 2.19
-0.5 -0.009*** 0.004* 2.08
0 -0.008*** 0.004* 2
0.5 -0.008*** 0.004* 1.93
1 -0.008*** 0.004* 2.04
1.5 -0.008*** 0.004* 2.1
2 -0.008*** 0.004 2.26
* p < 0:1, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01
DV: Cantril ladder (standardised)
Table A4: Reference Points: Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance Survey
Reference Point Neg. Growth Pos. Growth Ratio
-2 -0.001 0.005*** 0.21
-1.5 -0.006*** 0.005*** 1.14
-1 -0.008*** 0.003** 2.70
-0.5 -0.008*** 0.000 9.52
0 -0.008*** 0.001 7.08
0.5 -0.006*** 0.004** 1.60
1 -0.005*** 0.003* 1.81
1.5 -0.005*** 0.004 1.31
2 -0.005*** 0.003 1.51
* p < 0:1, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01
DV: life satisfaction (standardised)
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